The changing environment affects agriculture with uncertainty. On the other hand, policies to cope with risks may have strong impacts on the environment. We evaluate the effects of public risk management programmes, such as subsidized crop insurance, fertilizer use and land allocation to crops. We implement a mathematical programming model of a representative wheat-tomato farm in Puglia, a Southern Italy region. The results show that under the current crop insurance programmes, tomato production is expected to expand and will require larger amounts of fertilizer, whereas the opposite is true for wheat production. Policy and environmental implications are discussed.
Introduction
Farm business is the sector of production in which factors outside the manager's control may greatly affect final outcomes. In particular, agriculture is largely affected by weather fluctuations and climate changes [1] . These peculiarities have contributed to forms of public intervention aimed at reducing income variability that have no parallel in other sectors of the economy. In the United States, Canada and parts of Europe, the attention of farmers and their representatives has focused on the potential offered by the role of governments in farm risk management programmes [2] . The environmental consequences of risk management policy, such as crop insurance, have been hotly debated [3] [4] [5] . In particular, the determinants of insuring decisions are still not clear cut. Moreover, whether or not the purchase of crop insurance induces farmers to reduce the use of potentially polluting chemical inputs (intensive margin), expanding the cultivated land (extensive margin) is unresolved.
On one hand, chemical and fertilizer applications may increase or decrease yield and profit variance. On the other hand, crop insurance subsidies and higher levels of transfer payments are given to comparatively higher risk areas of production, inducing risk-averse farmers to expand productions.
In this framework, the Fischler reform [6] represented a systematic attempt to reorient farm policy to place greater emphasis on environmental, landscape, food quality and animal welfare objectives. There are five key new elements in the reworked common agricultural policy (CAP) framework [6] : the introduction of decoupled payments, crosscompliance, reorientation of CAP support towards rural development policy by modulation, an audit system and new rural development measures. In this context, direct payments are conditional on satisfying minimum environmental, animal welfare and food safety standards, and modulation of direct payments has been made compulsory, so that each Member State is forced to divert a (small) part of its direct payment endowments to the resources available for rural and regional development policies. The latest CAP reform [7] acknowledged that increased mobility and leisure time, and the relocation of population in rural areas, have all acted to increase the marginal value of environmental amenity.
A new role has been attributed to the primary sector, namely production of environmental goods and food quality and safety. This new role may be explained in terms of multifunctionality, which means that agro-environmental policies promote non-commodity outputs jointly produced with agricultural commodity outputs [8] .
At the same time, the new regulations arising from Health Check [9] confer management autonomy on Member States for the first time. They are now authorized to use up to 10% of the national maximum threshold, to supply specific aid in clearly defined cases. Among specific subsidies, art.35 [10] establishes that there is a possibility of using the first pillar for subsidising measures to cover the risk of economic losses caused by adverse weather conditions and by animal or plant diseases or parasite infestation. In actual fact, art.35 [10] allows financial contributions to be granted for payment of crop insurance premiums up to a maximum of 65% of the total premium in the form of EU co-financing (absolutely new in the history of the CAP in this context). This co-financing cannot exceed 75% of the national financial contribution.
In short, while both risk management and environmental policy have been specifically regulated, it is not yet clear how such programmes might act together, without one offsetting the other.
Hence the main objective of this investigation is to clarify the relationship between risk management policy and environmental policy in the context of farmers' agrochemical applications and land use. To our knowledge, this study is the first attempt of its kind in Europe. We show that revisions of government risk management programmes, may introduce potential distortion into farm-level decision-making which affects both the intensive (input use) and extensive (land use) margins. There could be a knock-on effect in terms of rural and regional policy, which currently represents the driving force of development for Southern Europe, i.e. Italy.
A large debate on risk management and environmental policies
There is a considerable body of work focused on the potential environmental impacts of government-sponsored risk management programmes such as subsidized crop insurance and crop disaster payments [11] [12] [13] [14] . All such studies are limited to the United States. Since North America has a long history of crop insurance, large data sets allow economists to estimate, with reliability, crop insurance adoption patterns, chemical input use and crop acreage allocation. On the contrary, in Europe, such data are unavailable, and farmers' behaviour under uncertainty has been insufficiently investigated.
An underlying policy question is whether the benefits provided by government-subsidized risk management programmes are offset by their costs, including those of unintended environmental effects, and whether or not risk management programmes could offset environmental programmes e.g. as predicted by Fischler's reform [6] .
Understanding the impacts of chemical inputs is crucial in environmental and economic science [15] . Pope and Kramer [16] modelled production risks by analysing their effects on input use. They considered a stochastic production function, under constant relative risk aversion assumption, and modelled risk as a function of input use. They showed that riskaverse agents that tend to use more inputs are able to decrease risks.
Ahsan et al. [17] investigated the relationship between crop insurance and input usage, and demonstrated that crop insurance encourages farmers to choose inputs as if they were risk neutral. Quiggin [18] introduced the moral hazard problem: he found that crop insurance may lead to a reduction in input use.
One of the most frequently cited contributions is the paper by Horowitz and Lichtenberg [11] . They pointed out that in many instances pesticides are more accurately viewed as risk-increasing. While the conventional wisdom is that pesticides are risk-reducing inputs, they found that their use may increase rather than decrease with crop insurance. Since Horowitz and Lichtenberg's [11] contribution was based on data prior to 1992, before the Reform Act [19] came into force in the US in 1994, some aspects of farmer behaviour may have changed in the meantime.
Smith and Goodwin [12] criticized Horowitz and Lichtenberg's [11] findings that multiple peril crop insurance could force farmers to increase chemical input use. They emphasized the strong linkage between increase in expected yield and increase in yield variance, if an input is considered as risk-increasing. The increase in variance positively affects the likelihood of an indemnity payment, but the increase in mean yield offsets it. The net effect is ambiguous. Smith and Goodwin [12] doubted that the expected indemnity payment increased with input use for two reasons. Firstly, chemical inputs increase production costs, and lower the expected profits when indemnity payments are made. Secondly, the critical yield that triggers an indemnity payment is determined by the farm's yield history.
Wu [14] found that crop insurance for corn in Nebraska caused a shift in production from hay and pasture to corn. In other words, crop insurance subsidies may also promote environmental degradation due to the increase in production, which may result in increases in overall chemical use for crops. This shift also requires considering environmental externalities at the extensive and intensive margins. Wu [14] also pointed out that an increase in chemical application rates may result from the 'moral hazard' created by crop insurance.
The Italian crop insurance system
In Italy, the government's activity in agricultural risk management is based on the wholly state-financed National Solidarity Fund (FSN), set up in 1974, with two main objectives: to compensate farmers for damage caused by natural disasters and to support the use of crop insurance. State contribution has constantly increased in nominal terms. This is mostly because of the increased share of combined peril policies that benefit from higher public subsidy to premiums (80%). Tariffs show a significant reduction between 2007 and 2011 (table 1) .
Until recently, access to disaster payments was open to all farmers, whether they had insurance or not. From 1981 to 2005, appropriations by the FSN have amounted to about €9.4 billion; 72% of which has been directed to disaster payments, while insurance subsidies have absorbed the remaining 28%. Over the same period, disaster payments averaged €234 million per year, reaching a maximum of €522 million in 1990. The Italian system of compensation for natural disaster damage is mainly reactive, in the sense that the initial yearly endowment of funds received by the FSN can be integrated with ad hocspecific legislative measures, when necessary. In 2002, total appropriations for the FSN were €481 million. The law that established the FSN [20] also authorized operation of farmers' associations at the provincial level (Consorzi di Difesa). These bodies had two functions: (i) collection of farmers' insurance demands (mainly for hail) and transferring them to the insurance companies and (ii) coordination and enforcement of common preventive measures. Despite subsidies of about 35-40% of actual premiums, the spread of insurance in Italian agriculture has been rather thin; the share of insured value on total crop productionmainly fruit crops and vineyardshas never exceeded 15%, reached in 1998 and decreasing in the subsequent years. One likely reason is the possibility for Italian farmers to access compensation for natural disasters even without the signing of insurance policies.
The Italian system has been modified in recent years with more emphasis on crop insurance, in an attempt to reduce the cost of ex-post compensation in the event of disasters. The main changes are the possibility for farmers to underwrite newly designed contracts for innovative multirisk coverage directly with insurance companies, with premiums subsidized up to 80%, and state-supported reinsurance. Eligibility is determined by an income loss, taking into account only income derived from agriculture, which exceeds 30% of average gross income or the equivalent in net income terms (excluding any payments from the same or similar schemes) in the preceding three-year period, or a three-year average based on the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest and lowest entry. [21] Moreover, the amount of such payments 'should compensate for less than 70% of the producer's income loss in the year the producer becomes eligible to receive this assistance' [21] Theoretical model For our empirical investigation, we used a non-linear programming model. We developed a model for farmers' decision-making which is able to capture the strategies when deciding to enrol in the environmental Programme (EP) under uncertainty. Moreover, this included the point whether their participation strategies could be offset by risk management programmes, such as crop insurance.
In order to analyse the effects of the introduction of a subsidy on the premium of allrisk insurance on yields, we used the Italian Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) [22] data set of two samples of firms for the Apulia region. In particular, we considered wheat and tomato products to consider heterogeneous products in terms of expected variability of yields/revenue. Our analysis concerns two case studies of the same lowland/ highland system.
The choice of wheat and tomato is due to their different yield variability (tomato yields generally show higher variability than wheat) and to different production characteristics.
The database is extracted from FADN-RICA [23] and includes 1092 farms, observed over the period from 2003 to 2008. Farmers' enrolment decisions in the EP carry various sources of uncertainty. The decision to participate in the EP must be made in the face of the well-known revenue uncertainty of agricultural production resulting from variability in output prices and crop yields. 1 Any expected utility model for risk-averse decision-makers would suggest that subsidizing premiums would encourage farmers to both increase their level of production and possibly increase it into riskier areas. The idea is that as a subsidy decreases, lower risk farmers would be less motivated to subscribe to crop insurance, and riskier farmers could abandon their production (probably from marginal land).
By modelling this, we could assume a multioutput firm with a fixed amount of land L * that can be allocated between j crops. The producer's problem is to select levels of x variable inputs for each of the j crops in the production plan and to allocate L * hectares of land among these j crops. The modelled farmer is a price taker in the output and variable input markets. The farmer decides to subscribe an all risk (ARI) crop insurance contract guaranteeing yield losses up to 30% of average yield, with the following payoff: {I j , M j } = 1, … ,I, where I j represents the random (eventual) insurance indemnity and M j is the non-random insurance premium for crop j. Moreover, at sowing time, the farmer could choose to receive the environmental payments (decoupled payments), λ 2 {0, 1}, by making his crop practice comply with the CAP's rules. We are assuming that crop insurance and input decisions are made simultaneously. This requires that the planning processes underlying both decisions should occur simultaneously, which would appear as a logical consequence of assuming that farmer decisions are affected by the overall economic environment, i.e. government risk management programmes and environmental payments.
At sowing time, total farm revenue P is plausibly based on the expectation made on price, yield and costs experienced in the previous season, such that:
where E(·) is an expectation operator; p e j is the expected per quintal price of the jth crop; y e j denotes the expected yield per hectare of the jth crop; cov (p j y j ) denotes the covariance between price and yield, and underlines the natural hedging mechanism between price and yield; and c i is the per hectare cost of production. The revenue per hectare for crop j and farmers I when crop insurance is subsidized and environmental payments occur is:
where p′ is the vector of the random price, y′ represents the vector of the random crop yield per hectare as a function of the input levels x j , c i is the non-random variable cost, r is the price vector of inputs x j and EP represents the environmental payments (where ϑ is an indicator variable for participation in the EP; ϑ = 1 if the farmer chooses to participate, 0 otherwise). Income per crop could be identified as S j p j ; where S j is acreage planted to crop j and total crop income p is the sum of income over all crops: p ¼ P j S j p j . The representative farmer maximizes the expected utility of income, choosing the acreage allocation S j , input use x j and participation in both EP ϑ and insurance programme: max A j ;x j ;# j ;i Z uðpÞdFðp 1 ; p 2 ; . . .; p j ; y 1 ; y 2 ; . . .; y j Þ
The farmer's utility function u ð Þ is the Von Neumann-Morgenstern [16] u 0 [ 0; u 00 \0 ð Þ , under the hypothesis of risk aversion, such that @ 2 U =@ 2 p\0 (Pratt, 1964), and decreasing absolute risk aversion; and F ð Þ identifies the joint distribution function of prices and yields.
The optimal acreage allocation and input use for each crop (S j and x j for all j) follows the constraints on acreage allocation S > P j S j . In this way, as introduced by Seo et al. [13] , the intensive margin effect of the availability of crop insurance and disaster payments for a crop could be identified with the difference in the optimal use of input x j , when the programme is available vs. when it is not. Similarly, the extensive margin effect could be viewed as a change in optimal acreage S j , when the same programmes are available.
In our analysis, we use a direct expected utility maximizing non-linear programming (DEMP), combined with simulation approach.
We used DEMP to maximize expected utility directly, by virtue of using quadratic programming, recurring at Monte Carlo integration to simulate data mining from a sample of yield and price, under the hypothesis on the distribution of these parameters. This approach allowed us to estimate the expected indemnity numerically, in which the computation of the expected indemnity is unfeasible using the analytical approach. The farmer's choice of the nitrogen fertilizer rate affects indirectly the mean and variance of the yield distribution. For this analysis, the functions for the dependence of the mean and variance of wheat and tomato yield on the nitrogen application rate were estimated using data from experiments conducted between 2003 and 2005 in Apulia region, Foggia province. Nitrogen fertilizer rates were experimentally varied from 0 to 300 q/ha and, correspondingly, wheat and tomato yields have been measured for each plot for a total of 53 observations. A quadratic equation identifies the final result for mean and variance with all estimated coefficients significant at the 5% level.
Empirical model
We developed a solvable expected utility maximization model which is (a) free of restrictions on the forms of the utility function and (b) free of assumptions regarding the distribution of the uncertain parameters [24] . The underlying assumption in the model implies that wealth effects could affect production decisions.
With negative exponential utility (# c ð Þ ¼ À exp Àh c ð Þ), the DEMP objective function for problem (3) is:
where k indexes each state (Monte Carlo random drawn), R is the coefficient of risk aversion 2 and p k ¼ P j S j p jk is the profit associated to the state k. Income from crop j in state k is:
which differs from equation (2) in the index k that scored each random variable.
In this context, the ARI insurance indemnities for any state k and crop j could be represented as: I ARI;jk ¼ PEF ARI;j max CVG ARI;j y j À y Ã jk ; 0
where y Ã j is the average yield used by ARI. Given that we set the model at only one trigger level, the non-random insurance premium for each crop does not depend, unlike in Seo et al. [13] , on several coverage levels. This makes it easier to calculate the expected net indemnity which is equal to the expected indemnity minus the actual premium and better represents the Italian crop insurance market.
Since the integration required to obtain the expected indemnity is analytically intractable for the model, we used Monte Carlo integration. In agriculture, simulation models are routinely applied to biological system analysis (e.g. crop simulation or environmental models) and there is always some uncertainty present in the system, which can be modelled by sampling from appropriate probability distributions.
Given that an integral can be approximated by computing the sample average of a set of function values, we have interpreted the integral as an expected value. We then had to establish that the mean we were computing was finite. Our basic statistical result for the behaviour of sample means implies that, with a large enough sample, we can approximate the integral as closely as we like. The general approach is widely applicable in Bayesian econometrics and has begun to appear in classical statistics and econometrics as well [25, pp. 181-183] .
Consider the function F
is a continuous function in the range [L, U], and suppose that g(x) is non-negative in the entire range. In order to normalize the weighting function, we assume that K ¼ R U L g x ð Þdx; is a known constant. Then h (x) = g(x)/K is a probability function in the range, because it satisfies the axioms of probability. Let H x ð Þ ¼ R x L h t ð Þdt. Then H(L) = 0, H(U) = 1, H′(x) = h(x) > 0, and so on. Then,
; where we use the notation
to denote the expected value of the function f(x), when x is drawn from the population with probability density function h(x). We assume that this expected value is a finite constant [25] .
Thus the expected indemnity is the average indemnity for each policy over all states of k :
Since the crop yields are known to fall in a range from 0 to some maximum possible value, and their distribution can be significantly skewed either to the right or to the left and the beta distribution has such flexibility, we introduced a random crop yield which follows a beta distribution into our analysis, with mean and variance that depend on the dosage of applied nitrogen fertilizer. The model was solved using the non-linear programme solver included in General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) [26] .
In particular, Excel carried out simulation to draw yields from the assumed distribution and prices. The optimal fertilizer rate was determined as an integer variable by specifying fertilizer rates in 0.1 q/ha increments centred at the province mean for each crop; the fertilizer rate also implied the level of the mean and variance of the yields. GAMS interfaced with Excel by the GDXXRW program distributed with GAMS. GAMS sends the required means and variances to Excel, then Excel generates appropriately correlated yields and prices using the method of Richardson and Condra [27] .
Results
To sum up, we have adopted a theoretical framework to model farmers' choices. The model has been calibrated with the data collected from the FADN database. Successively, we have solved a mathematical programming model to compute optimal farmers' choices. The results are shown in table 2.
With regard to the optimal fertilizer use and acreage allocation when the subsidized insurance programme is available, unsurprisingly, we show that crop insurance generally has a positive effect on the optimal nitrogen fertilizer rate for both wheat and tomato. Depending on the crop and the farmer's level of risk aversion, the optimal rate increases by about 5 q/ha. Crop insurance has a large effect on the optimal acreage allocation. When ARI is available, optimal tomato acreage almost doubles, accompanied by an appropriate decrease in wheat hectares.
The results in table 2 also show that as farmer risk aversion increases, the optimal nitrogen rate decreases for all alternatives, regardless of the crop because nitrogen is used as a risk-increasing input. In addition, optimal tomato acreage decreases and optimal wheat acreage increases, because tomato is the riskier crop. For the range of risk aversion levels explored, the optimal insurance coverage level slightly changed for tomato, but increased for wheat.
In our study, crop insurance positively affected both crops at the intensive margin. It would be inappropriate to compare our results with others reached in the past because of differences in the areas investigated.
Regardless of yield distribution, when crop insurance is available, farmers find it optimal to bear more risk and so choose fertilizer rates accordingly. Given our conditional yield distributions, this means an increase in the fertilizer rate. Once again, since our analysis was conducted in a different scenario, it would be prudent to avoid comparing it with others carried out in the past. 
Conclusion
The environmental impact of farming continues to play a significant role in policy debates over the role of government in the agricultural sector of the economy [28] . Some experts have argued that government policies aimed at reducing production risks may create potential incentives to undertake activities harmful to the environment. In other terms, agricultural subsidies may induce hazardous behaviours. For example, the provision of statesubsidized crop insurance may encourage producers to bring economically marginal land into production; if this land is more environmentally fragile than the land already farmed, this reduction in risk provided by state-subsidized crop insurance could lead to a reduction in environmental quality. 3 In addition to crop insurance, the government has set up many other programmes designed, among other things, to provide income support and reduce income variability in the agricultural sector. Some of these payments are linked to the current production of a particular crop, while other payments are decoupled from current production.
Although such programmes provide incentives to expand production on the extensive margin, they may also lead to reductions in environmental amenity and prejudice multifunctionality objectives. Besides encouraging production on environmentally fragile land, farm subsidies and risk management policies provide incentives for producers to alter their crop mix, cropping practices (including input use) and conservation practices.
Unsurprisingly, the results of our investigation show that crop insurance generally has a positive effect on the optimal nitrogen fertilizer rate for both crops under consideration. Crop insurance has a major effect on the optimal acreage allocation for both crops considered and positively affected both crops at the intensive margin level. The results are in line with conventional wisdom [11, 12] . Moreover, when crop insurance is available, farmers find it optimal to bear more risk [29] ; hence they would choose fertilizer rates accordingly which, given our conditional yield distributions, would mean an increase in the fertilizer rate.
Although it would be prudent to avoid comparing our analysis to others carried out previously, it would appear clear that agricultural policy, and more specifically insurance subsidies, has the potential to alter land use, cropping practices and conservation practices, and may contribute to increases in soil erosion [30] .
Moreover, it would seem that subsidising premiums could offset the benefits of EPs, as foreseen by Fischler's reform of Europe's agricultural support system [6] . In this sense, government risk management programmes undoubtedly introduce potential distortion into farm-level decision-making which affects both the intensive (input use) and extensive (land use) margins. Southern regions in Europe, such as Puglia, which are greatly affected by regional development policy, could see their future patterns of development jeopardized. These results may also be important for other Mediterranean Countries [31, 32] , particularly for Northern African Countries, which lack policies for risk coping and characterized by similar farming systems to those observed in Southern Italy. Understanding how policymakers should plan efficient policies for risk management is a promising area of research.
